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Introduction
The article focuses on German Federal Constitutional Court’s (Bundesverfassungs-
gericht) view on the differences between national and international (or rather su-
pranational) law and structure in the decision on the Lisbon Treaty.1  While holding
the Lisbon Treaty2  to be compatible with the German Constitution, the Basic
Law (Grundgesetz – GG), the Bundesverfassungsgericht explores, amongst other issues,
whether the European Union under this Treaty will attain statehood and whether
the European Union’s democratic standards are in accordance with the Basic Law’s
requirements.
* DAAD/Clifford Chance lecturer at the Faculty of  Laws, University College London.; I would
like to thank my colleague Dr Myriam Hunter-Henin and the editors of  this journal for their valu-
able comments on a draft of  this paper. All errors remain, of  course, my own.
1 Bundesverfassungsgericht (Second Senate), Cases 2 BvE 2/08; 2 BvE 5/08; 2 BvR 1010/08;
2 BvR 1022/08; 2 BvR 1259/08; 2 BvR 182/09, decision of  30 June 2009 (this article refers to the
preliminary English translation provided by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, which can be accessed
at <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html>).
2 Treaty of  Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the
European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 Dec. 2007, OJ [2007] C 306/1, 17.12.2007.
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The aim of  this article is twofold: it tries to explain the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s
reasoning, while at the same time critically assessing it and highlighting some pe-
culiarities. The article is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the ques-
tion of  the member states’ and the European Union’s statehood, i.e., the question
of  sovereignty and Kompetenz-Kompetenz. I will argue that the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s
formalistic approach to sovereignty as an absolute concept is worth re-consider-
ing when discussing the relationship between member states and the European
Union. The second part is concerned with the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s views on
the European Union’s democratic deficit, which it regards tolerable precisely be-
cause the European Union is not a state. This surprising argument will be the
basis of  a critical evaluation of  the court’s implicit denial of  the European
Parliament’s importance and the claim that there is no such thing as a European
people.
Sovereignty: Kompetenz-Kompetenz über alles!?
The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s understanding of  sovereignty
The first point to be addressed is that of  sovereignty or Kompetenz-Kompetenz. The
Bundesverfassungsgericht’s view of  sovereignty is based on Europe’s ‘statist’ tradition,
according to which sovereignty is indivisible.3  However, the court’s black-and-
white approach, whereby an entity either enjoys Kompetenz-Kompetenz and is thus a
State, or it does not and is therefore not a State, is not adequate. The division of
competences (and Kompetenz-Kompetenz) between the European Union and the
member states is too complex to be portrayed in such a simple manner. The
Bundesverfassungsgericht’s remarks in this respect are to be understood in the light of
the Basic Law’s limits to the transfer of  competences on the European Union.
Such a transfer may not lead to Germany losing its statehood. Article 23(1) GG,
which provides the legal basis for German integration in the European Union,4
expressly states that any Act of  Parliament ratifying a treaty amending the treaty
foundations of  the European Union is subject to the ‘eternity clause’ in Article 79(3)
GG. That article outlaws amendments to the Basic Law that affect the principles
laid down in Articles 1 and 20 GG (and thus guarantees their eternity). The latter
article expressly refers to Germany as a state, which means that the statehood of
Germany must not be given up. The Bundesverfassungsgericht phrases it as follows:
3 On this and the more flexible American tradition, cf. R. Schütze, ‘On “Federal” Ground: The
European Union As an (Inter)national Phenomenon’, 46 Common Market Law Review (2009) p. 1069.
4 When referring to the European Union, this article means the European Union after the entry
into force of  the Lisbon Treaty.
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The Basic Law does not grant the bodies acting on behalf of Germany powers to
abandon the right to self-determination of the German people in the form of
Germany’s sovereignty under international law by joining a federal state. 5
Therefore, the Bundesverfassungsgericht enters into a lengthy discussion as to whether
with the entry into force of  the Lisbon Treaty the European Union were to be-
come a State, and whether Germany would lose its statehood as a consequence. In
its assessment, the Bundesverfassungsgericht follows the traditional definition of  state-
hood first articulated by Georg Jellinek6  in his so-called three elements theory
(Dreielementelehre), according to which a State exists when three conditions are sat-
isfied: a territory, a people and sovereignty.7  The focus of  my discussion will be
on the last element.
The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s line of  argument whether Germany would lose its
sovereignty by ratifying the Lisbon Treaty does not differ from that in the Maastricht
decision.8  The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s view on sovereignty is primarily based on
the notion of  Kompetenz-Kompetenz, i.e., a state’s competence to determine its own
competences.9  The Basic Law prohibits the transfer of  such a competence on the
European Union.10  The member states must therefore remain ‘masters of  the
Treaties’.11  The European Union can thus only enjoy competences derived from
the member states.12  The principle of  conferred powers, i.e., the principle that the
European Union may only act where it has been given the power to do so, is
therefore not only a principle of  European law but also one of  German constitu-
tional law.13  The member states as sovereign states must remain the source of  all
competences enjoyed by the European Union and they must be able to revoke
these at any time.
In the Lisbon decision, the Bundesverfassungsgericht was faced with the question
of  whether, measured by these strict standards, the Lisbon Treaty was a step too
5 BVerfG, supra n. 1, para. 228
6 G. Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslehre, 3rd edn. (Berlin, Springer 1922) p. 183: ‘Als Rechtsbegriff  ist
der Staat demnach als die mit ursprünglicher Herrschaftsmacht ausgerüstete Körperschaft eines
seßhaften Volkes’.
7 A similar definition can be found in Art. 1 of  the 1933 Montevideo Convention, 165 LNTS 19.
8 BVerfGE 89, 155; the English translation can be found at: [1994] 1 CMLR 57.
9 The BVerfG does not spell this out explicitly, yet it becomes obvious when we look at the
decision: when applying the facts to the law, supra n. 1, paras. 299 et seq., the BVerfG mainly analyses
whether Kompetenz-Kompetenz has been transferred on the EU, para.328. It regards the right of  mem-
ber states to withdraw from the EU as (merely) conferring their sovereignty, para. 329.
10 BVerfG, supra n. 1, para. 233; BVerfGE 89, 155 (187-188).
11 BVerfG, supra n. 1, para. 231.
12 Ibid., para. 231.
13 Ibid., para.  234; the principle can be found in the present Art. 5(1) EC and in Art. 5 TEU
(Lisbon).
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far. I want to critically examine two points of  the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s conclu-
sion s that the European Union under the Lisbon Treaty does not enjoy any
Kompetenz-Kompetenz: amendments to the Treaties and the significance of  the right
to withdraw from the European Union. Finally, I want to point to the fact that the
court seems to have overlooked a Treaty provision codifying the European Court
of  Justice’s implied powers doctrine regarding the European Union’s external
competences.
Treaty amendments and Kompetenz-Kompetenz
Under the Lisbon Treaty, amendments to the Treaties will generally still require
the conclusion and ratification of  an amending treaty by all member states.14  De-
spite certain procedural peculiarities, this provision therefore reflects the situation
under public international law. However, the Lisbon Treaty introduces two simpli-
fied revision procedures and extends the scope of  the present Article 308 EC, the
future Article 352 TFEU. All of  these provide for amendments of  the Treaties,
without requiring the conclusion of  an amending treaty. Therefore, the
Bundesverfassungsgericht had to discuss whether these provisions confer Kompetenz-
Kompetenz on the European Union.
Regarding the simplified revision procedure outlined in Article 48(6) TEU
(Lisbon), the Bundesverfassungsgericht comes to the conclusion that the Treaty does
not endow the European Union with Kompetenz-Kompetenz, as that article expressly
states that it cannot increase the European Union’s competences.15  Rather it only
allows for substantive modifications of  primary law as it stands.16  Nonetheless,
procedurally this provision is a hybrid and a step away from classic public interna-
tional law. It still contains the requirement that the member states (and not only
the European Union’s institutions) approve the amendment. At the same time,
however, it no longer requires the conclusion of  an amending treaty. Rather the
amendment is implemented through a mainly internal procedure prescribed by
the TEU and not in the classic international law manner. This clearly reminds us
of  the amendment procedures of  a domestic constitution and the provision can
therefore be seen as a state-like element in the TEU. Substantively, Article 48(6)
TEU (Lisbon) applies to all provisions contained in Part III of  the TFEU (Lisbon),
i.e., provisions that lie at the very heart of  European Union primary law, such as
those on the Common Market. The Bundesverfassungsgericht, however, did not have
any problems finding this provision to be in accordance with the Basic Law as the
14 Art. 48(2) TEU (Lisbon).
15 BVerfG, supra n. 1, para. 314.
16 R. Streinz, et al., Der Vertrag von Lissabon zur Reform der EU, 2nd edn. (C.H. Beck, Munich
2008) p. 43.
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provision expressly requires the approval of  the member states in accordance
with their constitutional requirements. Therefore, from the point of  view of  the
Basic Law, the member states’ Kompetenz-Kompetenz is preserved since each mem-
ber state has to expressly approve of  an amendment.
The other provision which holds a simplified revision procedure of  the Trea-
ties is Article 48(7) TEU (Lisbon) and it goes further. According to this provision,
the European Council, inter alia, can change the unanimity required for certain
decisions in the Council of  Ministers to a qualified majority. National Parliaments
can oppose such extension of  qualified majority voting. In contrast to Article
48(6) TEU (Lisbon), the consent of  all the member states as such is not required,
making the procedure even more state-like, and only national parliaments are
granted a veto right. It is, therefore, an internal amendment procedure such as can
be found in domestic constitutions even though national parliaments will be given
a right to veto such an amendment. It is internal because the national parliaments’
veto right exists only by virtue of  the Treaty and does not mirror international law
requirements for two reasons. First, only the national parliaments may veto such
an amendment and not the member states as such. Second, the right given to the
national parliaments is merely a veto right, which means that they must act in
order to prevent the amendment, which means that their consent is not a neces-
sary requirement for the amendment. Substantively, the introduction of  a quali-
fied majority leads to a reduction in powers of  the individual member state, as it
can no longer block decisions taken in accordance with the amended procedure.17
Therefore, the introduction of  Article 48(7) must be regarded as conferring on
the European Union the power to decide upon the way some of  its competences
are exercised without the prior consent of  the member states. While the
Bundesverfassungsgericht did not choose to expressly acknowledge that Article 48(7)
TEU (Lisbon) confers some Kompetenz-Kompetenz on the European Union, it none-
theless required that the German representative in the Council may only approve
of  such a Treaty amendment after the German parliament has adopted an Act of
Parliament sanctioning the amendment.18
That the European Union enjoys some degree of  Kompetenz-Kompetenz is more
obvious when looking at Article 352 TFEU (Lisbon), which extends the scope of
present Article 308 EC to all policy areas. According to the former provision, the
European Union can act even in fields for which it has no competence if  this is
necessary for the attainment of  one of  the objectives set out in the Treaty. Proce-
durally, Article 352 TFEU (Lisbon) provides for a decision by the Council and the
17 BVerfG, supra n. 1, para. 317.
18 Ibid., para. 319; that act of  parliament would have to satisfy the requirements for amend-
ments of  the EU Treaties set out by Art. 23 GG.
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European Parliament but does not require that the member states approve it.19
Thus the procedure is a wholly internal procedure for the European Union since
no national authority can block the decision. Substantively, Article 352 TFEU
(Lisbon) will enable the European Union to extend its own competences.20  The
Bundesverfassungsgericht expressly states that Article 352 TFEU (Lisbon) can lead to
a Kompetenz-Kompetenz of the European Union21  It therefore comes to the (inevi-
table) conclusion that the German representative may not approve of  a proposed
piece of  legislation under this provision unless the German parliament has given
its prior approval.
The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s reasoning and its solutions warrant a few comments.
In sanctioning the procedures above, the Bundesverfassungsgericht relies on a rather
formal notion of  Kompetenz-Kompetenz and thus of  sovereignty. It regards Ger-
many to be sovereign as it (together with the other member states) still has the
formal right to decide upon the extension of  the European Union’s competences.
Ultimately the member states, at least in theory, have the right to dissolve the
European Union at any time they want.22  This rather formal approach works well
when dealing with the ordinary amendment procedure and also when looking at
Article 48(6) TEU (Lisbon), which expressly states that it cannot lead to an in-
crease in European Union competences and requires the member states’ consent.
Even when we look at Article 48(7) TEU (Lisbon), where the European Union
can clearly extend its competences, this approach could have still been employed:
the extension of  competences is limited to changes in the decision-making proce-
dures at Union level.
With regard to Article 352 TFEU (Lisbon), where the extension of  the Euro-
pean Union’s competences is not at all foreseeable, this is however not possible.
Here the Union is clearly given a certain degree of  Kompetenz-Kompetenz. There-
fore, the court had to choose: either it could declare the Lisbon Treaty to be in-
compatible with the Basic Law, which would have created a major political crisis,
or it could introduce a hurdle at national level in order to prevent the erosion of
national competences. It followed the latter path and requires that the German
parliament beforehand approves the extension of  competences in accordance with
the procedural requirements for the ratification of amendments to the European
Union Treaties. From the point of  view of  German constitutional law, the intro-
19 BVerfG, supra n. 1, para. 327.
20 The current Art. 308 EC has been used as a basis for competence in a number of  cases and
has generally been interpreted widely, cf. Paul Craig and Grainne de Búrca, EU Law, 4th edn. (Ox-
ford, OUP 2007) p. 93-95.
21 BVerfG, supra n. 1, para. 328.
22 BVerfGE 89, 155 (190); BVerfG, supra n. 1, para. 233.
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duction of  such a ‘clearance procedure’ ensures that the transfer of  competences
is sufficiently legitimised. Incidentally, it also gives the Bundesverfassungsgericht an
opportunity to judge whether an Act of  Parliament sanctioning the extension of
the Community’s competences surrenders Germany’s identity as a state, the so-
called Identitätskontrolle.23
To conclude, the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s reasoning cannot hide that under the
Lisbon Treaty the European Union has a certain Kompetenz-Kompetenz, albeit in cer-
tain limited areas. In addition, member states can no longer unilaterally exercise
some of  their powers to the detriment of  the European Union and have thus lost
their Kompetenz-Kompetenz in this respect as well.24  This leads to a rather paradoxi-
cal situation: on the one hand, the Bundesverfassungsgericht insists that the European
Union may not attain Kompetenz-Kompetenz and thus a degree of  statehood. On the
other hand, the court clearly sanctions the inclusion of  provisions granting
Kompetenz-Kompetenz to the European Union while being satisfied with the erec-
tion of  national hurdles that will bind the German representative in the Coun-
cil.25
This shows that, at least with regard to the European Union, sovereignty is a
relative concept. Both the member states and the European Union enjoy Kompetenz-
Kompetenz in certain fields.26  As Möllers has already pointed out with regard to the
European Constitution, the dichotomy of  dependence and autonomy is not work-
able for explaining the relationship between the European Union and national
legal systems.27  It would intellectually have been more honest and preferable if
the Bundesverfassungsgericht had expressly recognised that legal situation.28
Instead the Bundesverfassungsgericht chose to cling to its black-and-white approach
and got tangled up in it. It is easy to understand why the court followed this path.
23 BVerfG, supra n. 1, para. 240.
24 A. von Bogdandy and J. Bast, ‘The European Union’s Vertical Order Of  Competences: The
Current Law and Proposals For Its Reform’, 39 Common Market Law Review (2002) p. 227 at p. 237;
Schütze, supra n. 3, p. 1083.
25 On similar procedures in other member states cf. P. Kiiver, ‘German Participation in EU
Decision-Making after the Lisbon Case: A Comparative View on Domestic Parliamentary Clearance
Procedures’, 10 German Law Journal (2009) p. 1287.
26 J.A. Frowein, ‘Das Maastricht-Urteil und die Grenzen der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit’,
54 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (1994) p. 1 at p. 7.
27 C. Möllers ‘Pouvoir Constituant-Constitution-Constitutionalisation’, in A. von Bogdandy and
J. Bast (eds.), Principles of  European Constitutional Law (Oxford, Hart 2005) p. 184 at p. 201; in a similar
manner Herdegen questions with regard to the Maastricht decision whether the BVerfG’s approach
is suitable, cf. M. Herdegen, ‘Maastricht and the German Constitutional Court: Constitutional Re-
straints For an “Ever Closer Union”’, 31 Common Market Law Review (1994) p. 235 at p. 242-244.
28 Interestingly, Udo di Fabio, the reporting judge in the Lisbon decision, conceded in 1993
already that the EU enjoyed a factual Kompetenz-Kompetenz, cf. U. di Fabio, ‘Der neue Art. 23 des
Grundgesetzes’, 13 Der Staat (1993) p. 191 at p. 197.
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Had it acknowledged that the European Union will enjoy a certain degree of  sov-
ereignty, it would have either had to declare the Lisbon Treaty incompatible with
the Basic Law or it would have had to give up its long-standing jurisprudence
according to which Germany must not grant any Kompetenz-Kompetenz to the Eu-
ropean Union. In my view the latter should have been considered. There is noth-
ing in the wording of  the Basic Law that suggests that the European Union may
not enjoy a limited degree of  sovereignty as long as at the same time Germany
retains its status as a state. Moreover, such a solution would be in accordance with
the Basic Law’s openness towards European law (Europarechtsfreundlichkeit) as en-
shrined in Article 23 GG, which the Bundesverfassungsgericht repeatedly emphasises.29
The significance of the right to withdraw
The Bundesverfassungsgericht also considers its finding that Germany has not lost its
sovereignty to be underlined by Article 50 TEU (Lisbon), which explicitly gives
member states a right to withdraw from the European Union and sets out the
procedure that needs to be followed.30  At first glance at least, this provision shows
that there is a crucial difference between the European Union and federal states.
The constitutions of  the latter do not allow their constituent states to withdraw
from the federation. Under international law, such a withdrawal would have to be
regarded as an illegal secession.31  Therefore, the explicit right to withdraw from
the European Union may well be regarded as evidence for the thesis that the
European Union is not a state and that the member states have not lost their
sovereignty. However, the inclusion of  that right can equally be regarded as a sign
for the growing autonomy of  the European Union legal order. As Möllers has
pointed out, we must not forget that the opportunity to withdraw is granted by
virtue of  Article 50 TEU (Lisbon), i.e., by European law itself. Equally, the condi-
tions for a lawful withdrawal are spelt out by the TEU and not by domestic consti-
tutional or by international law. Therefore the Article draws the line between a
lawful withdrawal (i.e., in accordance with Article 50) and an illegal withdrawal.32
Thus the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s simple reference to Article 50 TEU (Lisbon) is
not in itself  a convincing argument for the total survival of  the member states’
sovereignty.
29 BVerfG, supra n. 1, paras. 225, 240, 241 and 340.
30 Ibid., para. 329.
31 An ethnic minority’s right to self-determination does generally not amount to a right to seces-
sion outside the context of  decolonisation. On the discussion in international law, cf. S. Mancini,
‘Rethinking the boundaries of  democratic secession: liberalism, nationalism, and the right of  mi-
norities to self-determination’, International Journal of  Constitutional Law (2008) p. 553.
32 See Möllers, supra n. 27, at p. 201-202.
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No mention of  the codification of  the implied powers doctrine
The decision warrants one last remark as regards the issue of  sovereignty. The
court leaves unmentioned that Articles 3(2) and 216(1) TFEU (Lisbon) contain a
codification of  the European Court of  Justice’s jurisprudence on the European
Union’s implied powers in external relations.33  Article 3(2) TFEU (Lisbon) states
that the ‘Union shall have exclusive competence for the conclusion of  an interna-
tional agreement, when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of  the
Union, or is necessary to enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or
in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope.’ Article
216(1) has a similar wording. The exact extent of  these provisions, and thus of  the
European Union’s competences in external relations, is hard to foresee.34  It will
therefore be for the European Union itself  to decide when it has an external com-
petence, and the only body which has jurisdiction to review such a decision is the
European Court of  Justice, which again is an European Union institution, albeit
under the supervision of  the Bundesverfassungsgericht. The provisions clearly give
the European Union a right to establish its own external competence by passing a
legislative act providing for such a competence. Therefore, Article 3(2) TFEU is
another provision giving the European Union some degree of  Kompetenz-Kompetenz
for external action. Why this provision escaped the scrutiny of  the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht is not clear, but it is certainly striking.
Is the European Union democratic because it is not a state?
Apart from the question of  whether the member states still enjoy sovereignty and
therefore statehood, the Bundesverfassungsgericht explores whether the European
Union is in compliance with the democratic requirements of  the Basic Law.35  The
Bundesverfassungsgericht came to the conclusion that the European Union complies
with these requirements precisely because it is not a state and its structure is not
the same as that of  a state.36  Article 23 GG is the provision in the Basic Law that
enables the legislature to transfer competences to the European Union. Such a
transfer, however, is limited by the ‘eternity clause’ of  Article 79(3) GG, which
provides that the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 GG, among which the
principle of  democracy, may not be affected. A transfer of  competences must
33 So-called parallelism, first introduced by the ECJ in Case 22/70, Commission v. Council [1971]
ECR 263 (AETR).
34 On the scope of  this provision, cf. M. Cremona, ‘Defining competence in EU external rela-
tions: lessons from the Treaty reform process’, in A. Dashwood and M. Maresceau (eds.), Law and
Practice of  EU External Relations (Cambridge, CUP 2008) p. 34 at p. 61-63.
35 Art. 20 GG requires that Germany be a democratic state.
36 BVerfG, supra n. 1, para. 278.
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therefore respect the principle of  democracy . Thus it was for the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht to ascertain that the European Union complies with democratic standards.37, 38
This assessment leads to interesting remarks about the differences in structure
between federal states and the European Union. Whether these differences justify
the court’s reasoning regarding democracy is, however, doubtful. I will first out-
line the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s argument and then show its flaws.
The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s line of  argument
First, the Bundesverfassungsgericht points out that the Basic Law allows for the Euro-
pean Union, which is based on the equality of  states and has been negotiated
under international law, to adopt a different model of  democracy than the Basic
Law’s .39  This is possible because the Basic Law is generally open towards interna-
tional law. This openness, however, cannot affect the German people’s right to
self-determination, which is the basis for Germany’s sovereignty.40
For the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the crucial point seems to be that the principle
of  conferred powers is preserved. As long as that is the case, the democratic legiti-
mation provided by national parliaments and governments, which is complemented
by the European Parliament, is sufficient.41  However, as soon as the threshold to
a federal state is going to be crossed, the European Union will have to comply
with the democratic requirements of  a state.42  This would be the case if  the Eu-
ropean Union becomes an entity that corresponds to the federal level in a federal
state.43  However, this it not the case as the European Union also under Lisbon
only exercises derived powers. Therefore it need not fully comply with the same
democratic requirements as a member state.44  So precisely because the European
Union is not organised as a state it complies with the democratic requirements for
supranational organisations set by the Basic Law.45
The court mainly looks at the composition of  the European Parliament to
prove that the structure of  the European Union is different to that of  a state.
Even after the entry into force of  the Lisbon Treaty, members of  the European
Parliament will be elected according to national quotas. According to Article 14(2)
37 Ibid., para. 244.
38 Cf. D. Chalmers and A. Tomkins, European Union Public Law (Cambridge, CUP 2007), p. 167-
177.
39 BVerfG, supra n. 1, paras. 219 and 227.
40 Ibid., paras. 219 and 228.
41 Ibid., para. 262.
42 Ibid., para. 263.
43 Ibid., para. 264.
44 Ibid., para. 271.
45 Ibid., para. 278.
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TEU (Lisbon), each member state shall be allocated a minimum of  six seats but
no more than 96 seats. This can lead to a considerable difference in the number of
people represented by one member depending on the member state.46  While each
member state’s quota is based on the size of  its population the quotas still do not
reflect the real differences in size.47  Therefore, the question had to be answered,
whether the democratic principle of  ‘one man, one vote’ is infringed.
The Bundesverfassungsgericht holds that the rule only applies within a single people
and that there is no single European people. With a view to these national quotas,
the court speaks of  an ‘excessive federalisation’ of  the European Union.48  Not
only is the composition of  the European Parliament determined by state quotas,
but also the composition of  the Council, the Commission and the Court of  Jus-
tice.49  In this context, the court mentions that the European Union’s model of
democracy is deficient if  measured by the standards that apply within states.50
However, since the European Union is not measured by these standards, the Lisbon
Treaty does not violate the Basic Law’s requirement that the European Union be
democratic.
Some critical remarks
The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s argument warrants some remarks. While I do not wish
to dismiss the concerns regarding the European Union’s democratic deficit, I would
like to point to some inconsistencies and peculiarities in the court’s argument,
specifically regarding the state as opposed to the European Union.
The first point is of  a more general nature and addresses the question of  why
the Bundesverfassungsgericht chose to address the problem of  the democratic deficit
in the way it did. The court comes to the conclusion that if  the European Union
were a state, its standard of  democratisation would not be sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of  the Basic Law. But since the European Union is not a state, its
democratic standards are sufficient. The Bundesverfassungsgericht discusses this point
after having explicitly stated that under the Basic Law the European Union may
not become a state, as this would automatically deprive Germany of  its statehood,
which is not possible under the ‘eternity clause’ of  Article 79(3) GG. It therefore
seems that the discussion of  this question was wholly unnecessary, unless the aim
is to criticise the state of  the democracy in the European Union in general. The
argument can therefore best be understood as a warning issued to the member
46 Ibid., para. 284.
47 The Bundesverfassungsgericht recalls that one German MEP represents about 857.000 citizens
whereas one Maltese MEP represents about 67.000, para. 285.
48 BVerfG, supra n. 1, para. 288.
49 Ibid., para. 288.
50 Ibid., para. 289.
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states for the negotiation of  future amending treaties: The court will not accept
any further integration unless the democratic deficit is overcome.
Furthermore, the denial of  the existence of  a European people is quite re-
markable in this respect since Article 9(1) TEU (Lisbon) expressly mentions the
‘citizen[s] of  the Union’, Article 10(2) TEU (Lisbon) states that these Union citi-
zens are represented in the European Parliament and Article 14(2) TEU (Lisbon)
reaffirms that the ‘European Parliament shall be composed of  representatives of
the Union’s citizens.’ Up until now, Article 189 EC stipulated that the European
Parliament consisted of  a representation of  the ‘peoples of  the States’. Both pro-
visions therefore clearly suggest that there is something which might be called a
European people. The Bundesverfassungsgericht, however, was adamant that a Euro-
pean people does not exist and points out that representation in the European
Parliament is linked to nationality and not to the equality of  the citizens of  the
Union.51  This, however, is not true. As Halberstam and Möllers have correctly
pointed out, an Italian citizen who lives in Lithuania votes for the Lithuanian con-
tingent in the European Parliament.52  Therefore, when determining where a Union
citizen casts his or her vote in a European election and thus by which national
quota of  members of  the European Parliament this citizen will be represented,
the decisive factor is residence and not nationality. Thus the argument against the
existence of  a European people is not convincing.
Another surprising point in this context is that the Bundesverfassungsgericht
attaches only very little importance to the European Parliament as an institution
of  the European Union. The foremost reason why it considers European Union
legislation and decision-making democratically legitimate is that the member states’
representatives in the Council have been legitimised by national parliaments.53
The court therefore considers that the European Union’s structure, if  measured
against the principle of  representative democracy, would be ‘considerably over-
federalised’ (erheblich überföderalisiert).54  The rationale behind this is clearly that the
European Parliament is still elected in national quotas. However, what exactly con-
stitutes excessive federalisation as opposed to ‘regular’ federalisation remains
unclear. This is not surprising when one considers that measured by the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht’s standards, existing federal systems would suffer from the same de-
fect. The constitution of  the United States, for instance, provides that each state
shall have at least one Representative in the House of  Representatives, which leads
51 Ibid., para. 287.
52 D. Halberstam and C. Möllers, ‘The German Constitutional Court says “Ja zu Deutschland!’’’,
10 German Law Journal (2009) p. 1242 at p. 1249.
53 BVerfG, supra n. 1, para. 271.
54 Ibid., para.288.
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55 Example taken from C. Schönberger, ‘Lisbon in Karlsruhe: Maastricht’s Epigones at Sea’, 10
German Law Journal (2009); Art. I, s. 2 of  the US Constitution.
56 BVerfG, supra n. 1, para. 271.
57 Art. 294 TFEU (Lisbon).
58 BVerfG, supra n. 1, para. 271.
59 Ibid., para. 231.
to the situation that the citizens of  Vermont or Wyoming are overrepresented.55
This is even more evident when we look at the United States Senate, which con-
sists of  two senators per state, independent of  the state’s population. It can hardly
be doubted, however, that the United States is a federal democracy.
Given the actual and future legal status of  the European Parliament it is sur-
prising that the Bundesverfassungsgericht considers it to be only an ‘additional inde-
pendent source of  democratic legitimisation’.56  The court explicitly equates the
Parliament with second chambers of  national parliaments, which are said to be
characterised by imbalances in representation and find the Parliament not a neces-
sary institution when it comes to democratic legitimation. Under the Lisbon Treaty
the Parliament’s influence will grow . The present co-decision procedure, which
will become known as the ordinary legislative procedure, will been extended.57
This means that the European Parliament’s assent will be necessary for almost all
pieces of  Union legislation. It will therefore become as important as the Council
in the ordinary European legislative process. To reduce the role of  the European
Parliament to one of  merely complementing the Council’s democratic legitima-
tion therefore denies its importance.
The Bundesverfassungsgericht seems to attach fundamental importance to the fact
that the European Union only exercises powers that are derived from the member
states. This seems to have influenced the court’s leniency with regard to the demo-
cratic standards with which the European Union must comply.58  Nevertheless, it
could be argued that it should not make a difference for the question of  demo-
cratic legitimacy whether the European Union enjoys its powers thanks to the
member states’ sovereignty or as a result of  its own sovereignty. In this context, it
is interesting to note that at another place in the decision, the Bundesverfassungsgericht
draws a comparison between the European Union’s derived autonomy and that
of  local self-government.59  However, it is hardly conceivable that the Bundesver-
fassungsgericht would at the local level accept the democratic deficits it finds in the
Union. Article 28(1) GG, which deals with local government, explicitly provides
that local government must be democratic and that it must be based on the prin-
ciple of  equal elections. Therefore, the court’s comparison with local government
is not convincing. Merely pointing at the fact the European Union’s powers are
derived from those of  the member states is therefore not a sufficient justification
for different democratic standards.
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60 Art. 23(1) and 79(3) GG.
61 BVerfG, supra n. 1, paras. 289-295.
62 Ibid., paras. 250-251.
Conclusion
The Bundesverfassungsgericht’s doctrine as regards the transfer of  competences onto
the European Union is based on the premise that Germany must not give up its
own statehood.60  The problem the court faces is that it equates the relinquish-
ment of  statehood with the transfer of  sovereignty (Kompetenz-Kompetenz). Even
though it could be argued that the European Union has gained some degree sov-
ereignty, the court had to deny that fact in order to be able to declare the Lisbon
Treaty constitutional. Nonetheless, it was obviously not satisfied with such an
outcome. This is why it introduced the requirement for a national clearing proce-
dure in cases of  a transfer of  further competences on the European Union. And
for the same reason the court felt the need to dedicate seven paragraphs of  its
judgment to argue why the European Union’s democratic standards would not be
satisfactory if  the European Union were a state.61  These remarks can therefore
only be understood as a warning. The Bundesverfassungsgericht makes it clear that it
would not tolerate a further transfer of  competences onto the European Union
should the problem of  the democratic deficit not be resolved.
The Lisbon decision shows that the Bundesverfassungsgericht had to struggle to
reconcile an increasingly state-like European Union with the requirements of  the
Basic Law, and especially the preservation of  Germany’s statehood. Despite the
criticism of  the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s reasoning, its concerns about the state of
democracy in the European Union should not be disregarded. It is dissatisfying
for Union citizens from large member states that their vote in a European election
carries less weight than that of  a Union citizen living in a smaller member state.
Equally, the court is correct in pointing out that democracy needs a viable public
opinion, which at present does not exist due to the lack of  a European public.62 In
order to show that the Lisbon Treaty nonetheless satisfies the requirements of  the
Basic Law, the Bundesverfassungsgericht chose to point out the differences between
the European Union and a sovereign state. In doing so, it was obviously the intent
to uphold the Lisbon Treaty. Yet the court equally did not want to compromise on
the requirements for democratic standards and the strict definition of  sovereignty.
This explains why parts of  the decision appear so contradictory.
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